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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2015, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence in 
Davis v. Ayala, a capital case challenging an all-white jury, to bring attention 
to the exceedingly harsh conditions of solitary confinement on death row.1 
Windowless cells the size of a standard parking lot space, meals through a slot 
in the door, monitoring by cameras, communication via intercoms, and 
containment in that space for twenty-three hours a day, with one hour allotted 
to exercise in a caged pen akin to a dog run—these are the typical conditions 
of solitary confinement on death row,2 and the condemned are subject to them 
                                                                                                                     
  Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty Development, University of 
Richmond School of Law. I thank Eric Berger, Emily Cherry, Christopher Corts, Paul 
Crane, Robert Highfill, Jim Gibson, Shari Motro, David Skeel, Carol Steiker, Mary Kelly 
Tate, Kevin Walsh, and Clark Williams for their comments on an earlier draft, and Snapper 
Tams for excellent research assistance. Special thanks goes to Marah McLeod for inviting 
this Response, commenting on an early draft, and engaging me in this important and 
thought-provoking discussion.  
 1 See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“This separate writing responds only to one factual circumstance, mentioned at oral 
argument but with no direct bearing on the precise legal questions presented by this case.”). 
In Ayala, the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of a Hispanic defendant who 
challenged his sentence based on the fact that he was tried by a jury in which all African-
Americans and Hispanics were excluded. Id. at 2208 (majority opinion). 
 2 See id. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Corinna Barrett Lain, Following Finality: 
Why Capital Punishment Is Collapsing Under Its Own Weight, in FINAL JUDGMENTS: THE 
AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE LAW (Austin Sarat ed., forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 15), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2792235 
[https://perma.cc/D9ZG-TXPA] (discussing conditions of solitary confinement).  
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for agonizingly long periods of time.3 As Justice Kennedy noted, the “human 
toll” of these conditions is both astounding and well-established, and yet the 
issue has received relatively little attention in the public discourse.4  
Enter Marah McLeod, who had already drafted her article, Does the Death 
Penalty Require Death Row? The Harm of Legislative Silence,5 when Ayala 
was decided. McLeod adds to a body of “expert scholarship” that Justice 
Kennedy views as key to understanding the complex issues presented by 
solitary confinement on death row, and solitary confinement as a penal 
practice more generally.6 Her article is both an endorsement of, and response 
to, Justice Kennedy’s chief lament: “[S]o stark an outcome ought not to be the 
result of society’s simple unawareness or indifference.”7 
In this Response, I first engage with McLeod’s article, summarizing its 
key claims and endorsing its call for legislative action, while disagreeing at 
times with the analytical moves it makes along the way. I then turn to two 
questions that the article inspired. One stems from comments in the 
constitutional, academic, and public discourse calling for indifference to the 
way we treat the condemned in light of the way they treated their victims. 
Given the depravity of the crimes the condemned have committed, why should 
we care about the conditions under which they are housed on death row? The 
other stems from McLeod’s description of death row as originally intended to 
facilitate redemption of the soul in preparation for destruction of the body. For 
those who still care about redemption of the soul—and religion runs deep in 
arguments for the death penalty and against it—how do the conditions of death 
row impact the opportunity for redemption, and how might the answer to that 
question contribute to the death penalty discourse today?  
A good article asks important questions. A great article inspires questions 
of its own. Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row? is a great article.  
II. A COMMENT ON THE CONTRIBUTION 
McLeod’s article makes two key claims. First, it argues that the human 
“waste management” system known as death row cannot be justified as an 
                                                                                                                     
 3 On average, the condemned spend just under seventeen years awaiting their 
execution. See Execution List 2015, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2015 [https://perma.cc/CDN3-GZ9Q] (listing 
years from death sentence to execution for each inmate executed in 2015).  
 4 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2209 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 5 Marah Stith McLeod, Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row? The Harm of 
Legislative Silence, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 525 (2016). 
 6 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring). An estimated 25,000 inmates 
in the United States are currently serving all or part of their sentences in solitary 
confinement. See id. at 2208–09. Just under 3,000 of them are on death row. See Death 
Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year#year 
[https://perma.cc/ZKH4-D6V5] (noting 2,943 people on death row as of January 1, 2016).  
 7 Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2209 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
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administrative necessity, as conventional wisdom would have it.8 Death row 
might be justified as a punishment practice, McLeod argues, but that makes it 
a decision only the legislature is competent to make—the second key claim of 
her paper.9 Legislatures are responsible for prescribing crime and punishment, 
McLeod reminds us, while prison administrators suffer from what she calls 
“executioner bias”—the tendency to favor structures that disassociate and 
dehumanize the condemned in order to emotionally detach from those they 
will ultimately be asked to execute.10  
These insights are original, important, and true. Death row is not an 
administrative necessity; it is a choice. And given the gravity of that choice 
and the incentives at work, the decision to have it (or not) should be made by 
legislatures rather than prison personnel. McLeod shines a much-needed light 
on the justification for death row, challenging our assumptions and bringing 
clarity to questions of institutional design. Her work constitutes a significant 
contribution to the literature.  
This is not to say that I agree with McLeod’s article at every turn. 
Although I was convinced by the article as a whole, I disagreed at times with 
the arguments it made along the way. Two in particular merit mention.  
First, the article claims that prison administrators lack the authority to 
maintain death row because it is not required for security reasons.11 But the 
fact that death row is not required for security reasons does not mean that 
prison administrators lack the authority to maintain it on those grounds. As 
McLeod recognizes, the Supreme Court has held that “a prison’s internal 
security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison 
administrators.”12 Thus, the question in my mind is whether death row makes 
enough sense as a security measure to justify it on that basis, even if prison 
administrators acting in their discretion could do something else instead. 
Maybe the answer to that question is no, but I needed a thicker account of 
                                                                                                                     
 8 McLeod, supra note 5, at 555 (quoting Mona Lynch, Supermax Meets Death Row: 
Legal Struggles Around the New Punitiveness in the US, in THE NEW PUNITIVENESS: 
TRENDS, THEORIES, PERSPECTIVES 66, 79 (John Pratt et al. eds., 2005)); see also id. at 565–
66 (“The administrative rationale for death row, grounded in claims that death-sentenced 
inmates are categorically more dangerous, has been undercut by empirical 
studies . . . . Retaining death row is not a necessity for security reasons.”). 
 9 See id. at 533. 
 10 Id. at 578–80 (discussing “executioner bias” on death row). 
 11 See id. at 531 (“This Article addresses for the first time the authority of prison 
administrators to establish death row. The analysis begins with a consideration of the 
nature of the decision to establish death row, and concludes—contrary to prevailing 
assumptions—that death row cannot be justified for administrative reasons.”); see also id. 
at 566 (“Retaining death row is not a necessity for security reasons. The fact that some 
death-sentenced prisoners are exceptionally dangerous does not require that all death-
sentenced prisoners endure the harshness of permanent isolation.”). 
 12 See id. at 571–72 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986)). 
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prison administrators’ power in the security domain to get there.13 Death row 
may not be necessary as a security measure, but it strikes me as at least 
plausible on those grounds and thus well within prison administrators’ 
discretion.14 Ultimately, this is no problem for me; I agree that death row is a 
decision only legislatures should make, but I come to that conclusion for the 
policy reasons that McLeod so powerfully articulates rather than her argument 
that prison administrators lack the authority to maintain it in the first instance.  
Having concluded that death row cannot be justified administratively, 
McLeod then turns to a discussion of the various punishment rationales that 
might justify its existence, which brings me to the other analytical move I 
resisted in her analysis. “Is Death Row Necessary to Rehabilitate the 
Condemned?” the article asks in one of its major subheadings.15 What 
rehabilitation?, I thought as I read, they are condemned.16 McLeod’s focus in 
this portion of the article is not on rehabilitation of the soul (a topic I return to 
at the end of this Response), but rather on rehabilitation as one would 
ordinarily understand it—as an attempt to help offenders become productive 
members of society.17 But the condemned will never become productive 
members of society, I found myself repeating, they are condemned.18 
McLeod’s argument is that the reversal rate for death sentences is so high that 
we should not think of them that way,19 and she uses the same logic when 
discussing whether the death penalty is necessary for retribution and 
deterrence as well. Death row could serve a retributive purpose, she argues, 
                                                                                                                     
 13 For the foundation of that sort of account, see generally Eric Berger, Individual 
Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision 
Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029 (2011). 
 14 See McLeod, supra note 5, at 540, 587 (noting that in most states, prison 
administrators maintain death row under their general authority to maintain security, 
although a few state statutes require that death-sentenced inmates be housed in a manner 
that affords maximum security, and a few specifically require death row).  
 15 Id. at 552. 
 16 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“Capital punishment by definition does not rehabilitate.”). I set aside in this discussion my 
qualms about conflating the necessary with the permissible, which permeates McLeod’s 
analysis in this portion of the article as well.  
 17 See McLeod, supra note 5, at 556 (“Any death row that is retained should prepare 
its inmates for the possibility of eventual reentry into human community, because many of 
its inmates will do so.”).  
 18 In Missouri, the one death penalty state that integrates the condemned with other 
inmates, id. at 547–48, one can imagine the condemned becoming productive members of 
the prison society—but that response assumes away death row, whereas McLeod is 
considering penal purposes to justify it.  
 19 See id. at 556 (“But the argument that rehabilitation is wasted on death row inmates 
because they will never reenter ordinary society, or even prison society, presumes that 
death-sentenced inmates will be executed. That is not true. Many death-sentenced inmates 
will not be executed. . . . The claim that rehabilitation is wasted on death-sentenced inmates 
because they will never reenter society is not only morally questionable but often factually 
incorrect.”).  
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but “the high incidence of capital sentencing error presents a profound 
challenge to the justice of harsh death row conditions imposed on retributive 
grounds.”20 Likewise, McLeod questions a deterrence-based justification for 
death row in light of the remarkably high reversal rate in capital cases and 
accompanying “risk of unjust additional harm to prisoners improperly 
sentenced to death.”21 
And that is what I have a problem with. McLeod is right about the 
remarkably high error rates in capital cases,22 but I do not see how that matters 
for the punishment purposes that might justify death row. For the wrongfully 
convicted, the proper punishment is zero. Nada. Zilch. Those people should 
not be on death row, or anywhere else in our corrections system. They should 
not have been punished in the first place, so there is no punishment practice 
that makes sense under this logic—death row or otherwise. The same is true 
for those who are not wrongfully convicted, but rather wrongfully sentenced to 
death. These are people who should not be on death row (by definition, that is 
the error) and, again, no punishment practice is justifiable for those who 
should not be subject to it in the first place. In short, we cannot look at error 
rates in evaluating the justification for death row as a punishment practice 
because no punishment practice is acceptable under that rationale. The 
argument proves too much.  
Again, in the end, I agree with McLeod’s core claim—death row may or 
may not be justified as a punishment practice (as opposed to administrative 
necessity), but that is a decision for the legislature to make.23 Moreover, I 
quite like McLeod’s discussion of death row as a punishment practice; I think 
she is right that its harshness belies a distinctly retributive purpose, albeit one 
that has not been expressly contemplated or approved as such by the 
legislature.24 My problem is with the logic of the argument here, not with the 
questions McLeod asks—indeed, the questions she asks are part of what 
convinces me that it is the legislature that should be answering them.  
In sum, McLeod’s question—Does the Death Penalty Require Death 
Row?—does a great service in forcing us to think about what it is we are 
trying to accomplish with death row, and how the answer to that question 
ought to influence the way we think about institutional design. The article is 
right about the need for legislative involvement and accountability in this area, 
notwithstanding my disagreements with its reasoning along the way, and it 
also caused me to pause and reflect on several other thought-provoking 
                                                                                                                     
 20 Id. at 563. 
 21 Id. at 565. 
 22 McLeod cites Bureau of Justice statistics indicating that over forty percent of 
persons sentenced to death between 1976 and 2013 were removed from death row due to 
court decisions or commutations. Id. at 556 (citing TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2013 – STATISTICAL TABLES 19 tbl.16 (Dec. 2014), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp13st.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4YZ-2TYX]).  
 23 McLeod, supra note 5, at 592. 
 24 See id. at 566–78. 
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questions associated with the harsh conditions of death row. In the remainder 
of this Response, I turn to the two that most captured my attention.  
III. CALLS FOR INDIFFERENCE 
As McLeod notes in her discussion of the possible retributive justification 
for death row, Justice Thomas wrote his own one-paragraph concurrence in 
Davis v. Ayala, stating, “I write separately only to point out, in response to the 
separate opinion of Justice Kennedy, that the accommodations in which Ayala 
is housed are a far sight more spacious than those in which his victims . . . now 
rest.”25 The comparison struck me as odd. But more than that, I was disturbed 
by the implication that we should not concern ourselves with how the 
condemned are treated given what they have done.  
Then it occurred to me that this sort of thinking is not all that uncommon. I 
still remember Justice Scalia writing about “the case of the 11-year-old girl 
raped by four men and then killed by stuffing her panties down her throat” and 
then adding with disdain, “How enviable a quiet death by lethal injection 
compared with that!”26 His comment came back to haunt him when the man 
condemned in that case was exonerated by DNA,27 but it was the comparison 
in the first place that I found so disturbing.  
One can find similar statements in the scholarly literature and public 
discourse. Retributivist Robert Blecker’s work is perhaps the best example of 
calls for indifference in the scholarly realm.28 And in the political arena, 
consider the following from the minority leader of the Senate in Virginia, my 
home state, who recently told the General Assembly in response to concerns 
about lethal injection: 
                                                                                                                     
 25 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). The 
concurrence continues (and comes to an end) with the statement: “And, given that his 
victims were all 31 years of age or under, Ayala will soon have had as much or more time 
to enjoy those accommodations as his victims had time to enjoy this Earth.” Id. 
 26 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1142–43 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial 
of certiorari) (discussing the convictions underlying McCollum v. North Carolina, 512 U.S. 
1254 (1994)).  
 27 See, e.g., Steve Benen, Scalia’s Perfect Capital Punishment Case Falls Apart, 
MSNBC (June 5, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/scalias-perfect-
capital-punishment-case-falls-apart [https://perma.cc/AHJ2-XEYK]; Daniel Bier, Scalia’s 
Defense of the Death Penalty Is in Tatters, NEWSWEEK (June 14, 2015), 
http://www.newsweek.com/scalias-defense-death-penalty-tatters-342329 
[https://perma.cc/8UU6-N6JC]; Dahlia Lithwick, A Horrifying Miscarriage of Justice in 
North Carolina: How Many Times Was Justice Antonin Scalia Wrong About Henry Lee 
McCollum and the Death Penalty?, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/henry_lee_mccollum_clea
red_by_dna_evidence_in_north_carolina_after_spending.html [https://perma.cc/48W9-RSGT]. 
 28 See generally ROBERT BLECKER, THE DEATH OF PUNISHMENT (2013). McLeod 
discusses Blecker’s work at McLeod, supra note 5, at 557–63. 
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So the guy suffers for two or three minutes. Let me tell you 
something—when you kill seven people, when you shoot a cop three 
times in the back of the head, when you hire somebody to slit your 
girlfriend’s throat in front of your children—I really could care less 
how damn long you suffer . . . .29 
The Richmond Times Dispatch, which covered the lethal injection story, 
reported that the state senator “also imagined a world in which criminals were 
executed in the manner of their crimes. Under that system, [the senator] said, 
Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh might be taken to a field and blown 
up.”30 
One of the wonderful contributions of McLeod’s article is that it caused 
me to think about these sorts of statements and comparisons in a serious way. 
Given how the condemned treated their victims, why should we care about the 
conditions under which they are languishing on death row, or the drugs we use 
in executions by lethal injection? For that matter, why should we care when an 
execution gets botched? Why not applaud instead? 
The answer, I submit, is the same reason we do not rape rapists, or torture 
torturers, or set fire to arsonists’ homes. It is worth pausing for a moment to 
think about that—why don’t we treat vicious criminals in a vicious manner? It 
is not because they don’t deserve it (at least in some talionic way)—because 
they do.31 It is that these people are so bad that a civilized society could never 
use the way they treated their victims as the baseline for how they should be 
treated. That sort of thinking would allow us to get even with vicious 
criminals—it is proportional—but a civilized society could never aim that low. 
This was Dostoevsky’s point in observing that “[t]he degree of civilization in a 
society can be judged by entering its prisons.”32 How we treat those we 
justifiably despise says more about us than them. 
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
embodies this principle—that we don’t do to others what they did to someone 
else, not because they deserve better, but because it would demean us. That 
said, my point is less about the Eighth Amendment and more about the values 
that animated its adoption in the first place. Those values are important not 
because they are codified in the Eighth Amendment; rather, they are codified 
                                                                                                                     
 29 Graham Moomaw, General Assembly Votes to Shield Identities of Companies 
Supplying Lethal Injection Drugs, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH (Apr. 20, 2016), 
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/article_25377abb-93b9-
5887-b314-c63adb8b0380.html [https://perma.cc/L359-FWTS]. 
 30 Id.  
 31 Lex talionis is the principle that a punishment should correspond in degree to the 
offense of the wrongdoer—“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” See Lex Talionis, 
DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/lex-talionis [https://perma.cc/L5NJ-
8V8A].  
 32 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting 
THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 210 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006)). 
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in the Eighth Amendment because they are that important. We do not impose 
cruel punishments even when criminals deserve them, and that is because the 
cruelty that they impose upon their victims is no model for the way a civilized 
society should treat its members, even the worst of the worst of them.  
And that brings me back to Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas observes that 
the conditions of death row are way more spacious than the coffin the victims 
are in33—and that is true—but what does that have to do with anything? Does 
he really think that the way a depraved murderer treated his victims is the 
baseline for comparison? If so, he ought to justify why that is the case.  
As I think about it, several of the Justices (and Justice Thomas is one of 
them) often begin their opinions in capital cases with a detailed description of 
the facts of the condemned’s crime even though that person is not challenging 
the propriety of the death sentence per se.34 At issue in these cases is how we 
treat the condemned before they die, while they die, and, most commonly, 
before they have been condemned to die—what procedural protections are due 
in the capital trial and sentencing process.35 I submit that the facts of the crime 
in this context have absolutely nothing to do with it; again, the way criminals 
treat their victims is no standard for how a civilized society should treat them. 
Indeed, as Eric Berger has noted in the lethal injection context, the nature of 
the crime is not something the Justices tend to reference in other Eighth 
Amendment cases involving prison conditions, medical care, and the like.36 So 
how do we explain Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Ayala? 
One possibility is that Justice Thomas disagrees with my analysis. Maybe 
he really does think that the way Ayala treated his victims tells us how we 
should treat him—or at the very least, that because of how the condemned 
treated their victims, we should not care about how we house the condemned. 
Again, if so, he ought to justify that reasoning, explain why that is if he can. 
Another possibility is that Justice Thomas cannot justify the reasoning but has 
not had cause to pause and think about it; perhaps no one has gently suggested 
that he do so. My earnest hope is that someone does. And then, of course, 
                                                                                                                     
 33 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 34 See, e.g., Lynch v. Arizona, 136 S. Ct. 1818, 1820–21 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 637–40 (2016) (Scalia, J., majority opinion); 
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2735 (2015) (Alito, J., majority opinion); Brumfield v. 
Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2283–84 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); White v. Woodall, 134 
S. Ct. 1697, 1700–01 (2014) (Scalia, J., majority opinion); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 
469 U.S. 412, 440 n.1 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“However heinous Witt’s crime, 
the majority’s vivid portrait of its gruesome details has no bearing on the issue before us.”).  
 35 See cases cited supra note 34.  
 36 See Eric Berger, Gross Error, 91 WASH. L. REV. 929, 993–94 (2016) (“Indeed, the 
Court usually does not reference the inmates’ crimes in other civil rights Eighth 
Amendment actions, involving, for instance, prison conditions or medical care.”); see also 
id. at 935 (“Along similar lines, Justice Alito described each of the inmate’s crimes [in 
Glossip v. Gross]. While these crimes were horrific and arguably justify the imposition of 
capital punishment, they are nonetheless irrelevant to the question of whether the State’s 
protocol violates the Eighth Amendment.”).  
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there is the darkest of possibilities—that such statements are made not because 
they have any logical relevance to the issue at hand, but rather to inflame 
passions. I feel a deep-seated need to believe that is not what is going on here; 
it would be so unprincipled, so unwise, so distinctly injudicious.37  
Regardless of what is driving such statements, it merits mention that they 
reflect poorly on the very institution we look to for its considered judgment. 
And they send a signal to others that such crass comparisons are fine—like the 
state senator in Virginia, who claims it just does not matter whether we get 
lethal injection right because of what these people have done.38 That cannot be 
the right answer, and should not be the signal our most respected intellectual 
leaders send.  
IV. REDEMPTION OF THE SOUL 
The other thought that McLeod’s article inspired comes from her 
description of death row as originally intended to facilitate redemption of the 
soul in preparation for destruction of the body.39 Indeed, this is where the 
word “penitentiary” comes from—the idea that punitive confinement could 
bring penitence, and with it, redemption of the soul.40 McLeod notes that death 
row today is justified on purely secular grounds, while acknowledging that 
vestiges of the religious purpose of death row remain and that it is not 
uncommon to see authentic religious conversions among the condemned.41 
Karla Faye Tucker is perhaps the most famous example of this sort of spiritual 
transformation on death row, but her story is just one among many.42  
I found McLeod’s discussion of the origin of death row intriguing given 
the role of religion in arguments for and against the death penalty today.43 In 
                                                                                                                     
 37 What if Justice Thomas is just angry—angry about Justice Kennedy reaching out to 
address an issue not properly raised in Ayala, and angry about the solicitude given to 
capital defendants in light of the nature of their alleged crimes? It seems to me that the 
three possibilities still hold. Maybe he thinks that the comparison is a relevant answer to 
Kennedy’s overreaching (if so, he should explain why that is). Or maybe he just hasn’t 
thought about it (in which case, he should). Or maybe he is channeling his anger into 
deliberately inflammatory rhetoric (which is neither principled, nor wise, nor judicious). 
 38 Moomaw, supra note 29. 
 39 See McLeod, supra note 5, at 552–53. 
 40 See Pat Robertson, Transcript of Speech on Religion’s Role in the Administration of 
the Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 215, 220 (2000).  
 41 See McLeod, supra note 5, at 553. 
 42 See Paula M. Cooey, Women’s Religious Conversions on Death Row: Theorizing 
Religion and State, 70 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 699, 699–700 (2002); Byron R. Johnson, 
Jailhouse Religion, Spiritual Transformation, and Long-Term Change, AM. OUTLOOK, 
Spring/Summer 2011, at 31, 34–35. 
 43 See Davison M. Douglas, God and the Executioner: The Influence of Western 
Religion on the Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 137, 137–38 (2000) (“[P]ublic 
debates about the death penalty and its use invariably invite considerations of what our 
religious traditions teach us about the morality of capital punishment.”); Samuel J. Levine, 
Capital Punishment and Religious Arguments: An Intermediate Approach, 9 WM. & MARY 
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the domestic discourse, I am primarily referring to Christian arguments for and 
against the death penalty,44 and since Christians are deeply committed to 
redemption of the soul,45 McLeod’s discussion led me to think about how the 
current conditions of death row might impact the redemptive purpose once 
served there. I concede at the outset that I am now writing from a particular 
perspective—one that cares about redemption of the soul—and that my 
thoughts will likely not resonate for those who do not share that perspective. 
The lens is clearly Christian (although it may well be other things too) and in 
the interest of full disclosure, the Christian perspective is also mine personally. 
Indeed, it was thinking about death row then and now as a Christian that led to 
these thoughts in the first place.46 For the record, I do not think we use death 
row for redemption today, and I am not suggesting that we do so. But for those 
who still care about things like repentance and redemption of the soul, what 
are the implications of the exceedingly harsh and drawn out conditions of 
death row? 
McLeod argues that pre-execution confinement lasts too long to serve the 
religious purpose it once did; in her view, it was the “temporal pressure” of 
being at death’s door that caused criminals to repent in anticipation of meeting 
their maker.47 While I agree that the prospect of impending death can lead to 
                                                                                                                     
BILL RTS. J. 179, 180 n.2 (2000) (stating that “[r]eligion has consistently played a role in 
discussions of capital punishment in the courtroom, judicial opinions, and legal 
scholarship” and citing examples); see also infra note 45 (discussing the role of religion in 
arguments for and against the death penalty among Christians).  
 44 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN: FORGIVENESS AND ITS LIMITS 96 (2003) 
(noting that the Christian tradition is “highly influential” on a number of political issues 
and that “[t]his is certainly true in the United States, for example, where people on both 
sides of the capital punishment debate often use biblical references in order to claim the 
moral high ground.”); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Conservatives and the Death Penalty, 9 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 31, 32 (2000) (discussing support for the death penalty among 
“theologically conservative Christians, often labeled as the ‘Religious Right’”); Douglas, 
supra note 43, at 162–68 (discussing opposition to the death penalty by “virtually every 
mainline Protestant denomination, the Catholic Church, and most Jewish groups” and 
support for the death penalty by “conservative Protestant groups” such as the Southern 
Baptists); see also infra note 62 (referencing arguments for and against the death penalty 
based on scripture and other religious doctrine). 
 45 As philosopher Jeffrie Murphy explains, 
“[F]or the Christian, what happens to the human soul—in this life and the next—is of 
primary concern. . . . Physical death, on the Christian view, is not the end of the 
person and is not the gravest of evils we can imagine or inflict. Physical death is the 
beginning of a process that can end either in what is the gravest of evils—eternal 
estrangement from God—or the greatest of goods, eternal communion with God.”  
MURPHY, supra note 44, at 98–99; see also Berg, supra note 44, at 59 (“Christian theology 
emphasizes the possibility of redeeming even the worst sinner . . . .”). 
 46 That, and the song “Redeemed.” See BIG DADDY WEAVE, Redeemed, on LOVE 
COME TO LIFE (Fervent Records 2012) (lyrics available at 
http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/bigdaddyweave/redeemed.html [https://perma.cc/E7JA-36ZT]).  
 47 McLeod, supra note 5, at 554. 
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repentance and redemption—this is the insight in the saying, ‘there are no 
atheists in foxholes’—I am not so sure that the lack of impending death, at 
least on death row, necessarily cuts the other way. Hypothetically, it could be 
the case that the harsh conditions of death row, and the amount of time that the 
condemned languish there, work in favor of the historical purpose of death 
row rather than against it. Draconian? Absolutely. Recommended? Not even 
close. If we care about genuine redemption, we ought never use suffering to 
induce it.48 But for born-again Christians who say they needed to hit rock 
bottom before giving their life to Christ,49 it is not obvious which way the 
conditions of death row actually cut. The long wait to execution dissipates 
whatever motivation comes with being at death’s door, but the torturous 
conditions, and the amount of time that the condemned must endure them, sure 
look like rock bottom to me.50  
But then it occurred to me—no matter how long the condemned spend on 
death row, their opportunity for redemption is still artificially shortened by the 
state when they are executed. The death penalty takes away days, months, 
years from a person’s life; that is the point, that is the penalty. What if the time 
the state takes is the time that person needed for redemption?  
Karla Faye Tucker is a prime example. I was reading about her for this 
Response when I came across a talk about the death penalty by none other than 
TV evangelist Pat Robertson. I had wondered what someone like Robertson 
would say about the redemption question, and there it was in the transcript, 
someone in the audience had asked him about it.51 Here is what he said:  
Very good point, I’ve had it raised before, and I think it’s—she had 13 
years of appeals, and during that period of time, she had a profound 
religious conversion, and had she been executed within a few weeks of 
her sentence, that never would have happened, and I don’t know what 
                                                                                                                     
 48 See MURPHY, supra note 44, at 37 (“When a person comes to repentance as a result 
of his own spiritual growth, we are witness to an inspiring transformation of character. Any 
expressed repentance that is nothing more than a response to a coercive external incentive, 
however, is very likely to be fake. . . . [O]ut of respect for the genuine article, let us not 
seek to coerce it.”). 
 49 See Johnson, supra note 42, at 33 (“[S]uch conversions tend to be tied to people in 
utter despair, and with absolutely no hope they turn to God as a last resort.”). 
 50 One might counter that as the prospect of execution becomes more remote, it 
becomes harder for the condemned to actually hit rock bottom—at least they do not have 
death to worry about. But I am not sure why the prospect of living the rest of one’s life in 
solitary confinement on death row would be any more bearable. And that is my only point 
here—that it is just not clear how the conditions of modern death row cut by way of 
motivating redemption, as opposed to what I talk about next, which is ensuring that the 
state does not deprive someone of the possibility of it.  
 51 See Berg, supra note 44, at 54 (discussing Robertson’s speech and noting, “Then 
came the obvious question from the audience: given the unlimited power of God, how do 
you know that any given death-row convict, no matter how unrepentant now, would not be 
similarly transformed in the future?”). 
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the answer is. Some things you have to leave to the Lord, but in order 
to accommodate that, you’d have to essentially do away with the death 
penalty entirely because you never know at what point of time 
somebody would have an experience . . . . Frankly, the point you 
raised is excellent and I don’t have an answer for it, I really don’t.52  
I’m not sure if Pat Robertson saying the point is excellent and he doesn’t have 
an answer for it makes me feel better, or worse. But there it is. 
An even better example may be Charles “Tex” Watson, who was once 
Charles Manson’s right-hand man.53 Watson was convicted of multiple 
murders and sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted to life in 
prison when California temporarily abolished its death penalty in 1971.54 He 
has since become a born-again Christian and ordained minister, serving those 
with whom he is serving time.55 He has also founded Abounding Love, a 
prison outreach ministry dedicated to sharing the Good News.56 All this came 
about after he became a “lifer.” What if he had been executed instead? 
Redemption is hard for an angry twenty-something.57 But time works 
changes, and what is true generally is true of angry twenty-somethings as well. 
Sometimes redemption takes growing up, staying sober, and living with regret. 
In short, sometimes redemption takes time. So I am back to my original 
question—what if by executing the condemned, we take away the time it 
takes?  
Calvinists would probably answer that if God had laid claim to that soul, 
redemption would have happened in some way.58 But I am not a Calvinist, and 
so I am far less confident about knowing how God resolves the tension 
between predestination and free will. As such, the possibility that by executing 
the condemned, we may take away the days, months, even years necessary for 
                                                                                                                     
 52 Pat Robertson, Speech at William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Symposium: 
Religion’s Role in the Administration of the Death Penalty 10 (2000) (transcript available 
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/PRobertsonWMSpeech.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRV9-
QC62]); see also Berg, supra note 44, at 54 (“Robertson candidly admitted that he had no 
answer to that question.”). For the published version of Dr. Robertson’s speech, without 
the transcription of the question and answer period, see Robertson, supra note 40.  
 53 See Johnson, supra note 42, at 33. 
 54 See Manson Follower Seeks Parole in California, USA TODAY (Nov. 16, 2011), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-11-16/charles-manson-follower-
parole/51234868/1 [https://perma.cc/C4L2-78TE]; see also People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 
880, 899 (Cal. 1972) (abolishing the death penalty under the state constitution’s cruel and 
unusual punishments clause). 
 55 Johnson, supra note 42, at 33. 
 56 See ABOUNDING LOVE WITH CHARLES D. WATSON, http://www.abounding 
love.org/main [https://perma.cc/WD84-YJ64]. 
 57 I credit Eric Berger, with thanks, for this insight and articulation of the point. 
 58 Calvinists believe that “God, not man, determines who will be the recipients of the 
gift of salvation.” Calvinism, CTR. FOR REFORMED THEOLOGY & APOLOGETICS, 
http://www.reformed.org/calvinism/ [https://perma.cc/2RUH-PQEF]. 
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something incredibly important to happen—again, at least from the 
perspective of those who care about redemption of the soul (for whatever 
reason and in light of whatever tradition)—is a prospect I find deeply 
troubling. Almost as troubling as the fact that I am just now thinking about 
these sorts of things for the first time.  
This is not to say that any of these insights are new. A little research 
uncovered Saint Augustine making the same point over a thousand years 
ago,59 and the Catholic Catechism codifying it for the last twenty-five.60 
Philosopher Jeffrie Murphy has also recognized the point, emphasizing that it 
is not to be taken lightly: “[F]rom a Christian point of view,” he notes, “there 
is no more serious way of harming a person than to pose obstacles to that 
person’s opportunity to repent, reform, atone, and thereby open himself to the 
possibility of redemption and salvation.”61 As it turns out, viewing the death 
penalty through the lens of redemption is not new; it was just new to me.  
And this is interesting, too. To the extent Christian values and rhetoric 
have played a part in the death penalty discourse here in the United States, 
they have tended to focus on the corporal aspect of capital punishment—
respect for life on the one hand, “eye for an eye” on the other.62 What I have 
not seen in the religious arguments that permeate the public discourse is a 
concern for redemption of the soul.63 Perhaps this is because of where it takes 
                                                                                                                     
 59 See Berg, supra note 44, at 53–54 (quoting sermon of Saint Augustine stating, 
“Thus, do not go so far as to kill the criminal, for in wishing to punish the sin, you are 
destroying the man. Do not take away his life; leave him the possibility of repentance.”). 
 60 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 604 (Doubleday 2d ed. 2003) (“Today, 
in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for effectively preventing 
crime, by rendering one who has committed an offense incapable of doing harm—without 
definitively taking away from him the possibility of redeeming himself—the cases in 
which the execution of an offender is an absolute necessity ‘are very rare, if not practically 
nonexistent.’” (citing POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE: EVANGELIUM VITAE 100 
(1995))). 
 61 MURPHY, supra note 44, at 112.  
 62 See also Douglas, supra note 43, at 164–68 (discussing rationale for Catholic 
opposition to the death penalty based on respect for life, and support for the death penalty 
by conservative Protestants based on theological beliefs about the legitimacy of 
retribution). Compare The Church’s Anti-Death Penalty Position, U.S. CONF. CATH. 
BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/death-penalty-
capital-punishment/catholic-campaign-to-end-the-use-of-the-death-penalty.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/7S56-AWMR] (“The new evangelization calls for followers of Christ 
who are unconditionally pro-life: who will proclaim, celebrate and serve the Gospel of life 
in every situation. A sign of hope is the increasing recognition that the dignity of human 
life must never be taken away, even in the case of someone who has done great evil.” 
(quoting Pope John Paul II, Papal Mass in St. Louis, Missouri (Jan. 27, 1999))), with 
Genesis 9:6 (King James) (“Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed; 
for in the image of God made he man.”), and Exodus 21:23–25 (King James) (“And if any 
mischief follows, then thou shalt give life for life, [e]ye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for 
hand, foot for foot, [b]urning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.”). 
 63 This is ironic not only because redemption is a core Christian value, but also 
because theologically conservative Christians—the “Religious Right”—are, as Tom Berg 
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us; for those committed to redemption, the central challenge would appear to 
be justifying the death penalty over the redemption-maximizer of life without 
parole. But whatever the reason and wherever it leads, those who profess to 
care about things like repentance and redemption should at least be talking in 
those terms. What Justice Kennedy wrote in Ayala is equally applicable here: 
“[S]o stark an outcome ought not to be the result of . . . simple unawareness or 
indifference.”64 Back to the beginning seems a fitting way to close. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The death penalty is a breathtakingly complex issue, with or without death 
row. Yet that complexity affords a unique opportunity for us to pause and 
think hard about what we are trying to accomplish, and what values—legal, 
religious, or otherwise—should be guiding us along the way. McLeod’s article 
is a commendable step in that direction, both for the questions it asks and the 
questions it inspires us to ask on our own. 
                                                                                                                     
notes, both “the most fervent supporters of capital punishment in America today,” and 
particularly noteworthy for their “emphasis on ‘personal redemption:’ that the individual 
person can receive salvation from sin through God’s forgiveness and grace, followed by 
personal transformation and a direct relationship with God.” Berg, supra note 44, at 32, 
47–48. 
 64 See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
